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Abstract 
We analyze the labor market for painters in Baroque Rome using unique 
panel data on primary sales of still lifes, portraits, genre paintings, 
landscapes and figurative paintings. In line with the traditional hierarchy of 
genres, average price differentials between them were high. We identify 
supply and demand factors related to prices of paintings. The panel 
dimension of the dataset and its matched painter-patron nature allow us to 
evaluate the extent to which price heterogeneity is related to unmeasured 
differences among painters or patrons. Most of the inter-genre price 
differential is explained by the variation in average individual heterogeneity 
across genres: this suggests that the market was rather competitive and 
allocated artists between artistic genres to the point of equalizing the 
marginal return of each genre. We also explain residual price differences in 
terms of efficiency wage, signalling and incentive mechanisms to induce 
effort in the production of artistic quality. 
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 ￿Caravaggio said that it takes as much manufacture to do a good painting of ￿owers
as of human ￿gures,￿Vincenzo Giustiniani, Letter on painting (1620-1630)
1 Introduction
Rational and equilibrium behavior has characterized economic phenomena since the development
of free market economies, but the lack of reliable data on ancient markets has made it di¢ cult
to test economic theories in historical contexts. The art market is an interesting exception, for
which data on prices, contracts and supply and demand factors are available from art historical
studies and economic investigations start to emerge (see De Marchi, 1995; Montias, 2002; Etro
and Pagani, 2012). In this work we examine the labor market for painters based in Rome,
which at the time was the leading art center of the Western world, through unique panel data
on paintings of the Baroque age based on art historical sources (Spear and Sohm, 2010), and
we provide evidence that such a market did follow standard economic mechanisms concerning
equilibrium pricing and occupational choices.
The most impressive and rapid phenomenon of the XVII century art industry has been
the innovative form of artistic di⁄erentiation that led to the mass production of new genres of
paintings. Besides traditional ￿gurative paintings, which here we de￿ne as including religious,
mythological and historical subjects, and besides portraits, the new genres of the Baroque art
market included still lifes (reproducing animals, fruits, ￿ owers and lifeless objects), so-called
genre paintings (reproducing daily life scenes, as in Fig. 1), landscapes (reproducing the urban
environment or the countrysid as in Fig. 2) and battles (reproducing ￿ghts without necessarily a
speci￿c historical content). Each genre represented a speci￿c sector of production, and painters
either specialized in one or few genres or they could switch between them according to the
market opportunities. The prestige of the genres was rigorously ranked in the artistic culture of
the time. The most digni￿ed and worthy subjects were those depicting creative compositions of
idealized human ￿gures, followed by idealized landscapes. Compositions of the daily aspects of
reality (the so-called genre paintings) were at a lower level, while the least worthy genres were
those imitating reality without idealization, as portraits and, at the lowest level, still lifes (Spear
and Sohm, 2010, p. 91). Such a ranking was well understood between art critics, art collectors
and artists, and later codi￿ed by the art academies (FØlibien, 1668). A preliminary look at our
data on primary sales of paintings in Baroque Rome suggests that this hierarchy of genres was
also associated with a clear ranking of payments among the di⁄erent genres. Price di⁄erentials
between them were sizable: the average prices in Roman silver scudi were, respectively, 17 scudi
for still lifes, 25 for genre paintings, 39 for portraits, 66 for landscapes and 240 for ￿gurative
1Figure 1: Caravaggio, genre painting: The fortune teller (1595), Louvre Museum, Paris
paintings.
Paintings of di⁄erent genres obviously di⁄er in many dimensions (e.g., size, technique,
support, destination) and price di⁄erentials did not necessarily re￿ ect di⁄erences in the e⁄ective
compensation of the painters. However, as long as the market was competitive and painters could
freely choose whether to specialize in one genre or switch between genres to exploit pro￿table
opportunities, we can hardly imagine that systematic compensation di⁄erentials could persists
between artistic sectors. For instance, if e⁄ective payments for landscapes were above those paid
for still lifes of equivalent features because buyers had a relative preference for landscapes, we
would simply expect more painters to paint landscapes until the price di⁄erential disappears,
eliminating any pro￿table opportunities. In other words, in equilibrium painters should be
allocated between commissions to the point of equalizing the marginal return of each genre.
Our main objective is to test this hypothesis of price equalization between genres. To do so
2we adopt a labor market framework in which di⁄erent genres are interpreted as di⁄erent indus-
tries, patrons as the employers and painters as the workers.1 If artists￿ s mobility between artistic
￿elds (genres) was endogenous, we expect that, after controlling for demand and supply side
features, any price di⁄erential between paintings of di⁄erent genres should disappear. In labor
economics, a similar hypothesis is known as wage equalization between sectors and ￿rms, and
there is a wide empirical literature examining its validity (e.g., Dickens and Katz, 1987; Murphy
and Topel, 1987; Krueger and Summers, 1988; Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis, 1999, hereafter
AKM; Manning, 2003). In modern labor markets, wide wage di⁄erentials across sectors (and
￿rms) have been observed for observationally similar workers and they can be hardly explained
on the basis of competitive theories of the labor market.2 Once controlling for the observable
characteristics of workers and jobs, there is a variety of reasons which may explain the existence
of wage di⁄erentials across both sectors and ￿rms such as the imperfect mobility of workers (e.g.,
search frictions, networks), compensating wage di⁄erentials and e¢ ciency wages/rent sharing.3
The main empirical problems in explaining wage di⁄erentials typically rely in the di¢ culty of
obtaining a detailed matched employer-employee dataset about a competitive labor market and
observing the same worker employed in multiple sectors and in di⁄erent ￿rms (without selection
on workers switching jobs). The advantage of analyzing an artistic labor market is that we
observe workers (painters) that are constantly switching between artistic ￿elds (genres of paint-
ings) and between employers (patrons). Moreover, since old masters received a similar general
training and the di⁄erences in productivity and artistic talent (or in reputation) were typically
worker-speci￿c, we can fully capture them through artists ￿xed e⁄ects.
Our empirical analysis is based on a unique panel data on painters active in Rome in the
XVII century, drawn from the database put together by the art historian Richard Spear and
administered by the Getty Research Institute (see Spear and Sohm, 2010)4. It is a matched
employer-employee (patron-painter) dataset and hence it allows to analyze the inter-industry
(genre) price di⁄erential exploring the role of worker (artist) and ￿rm (patron) heterogeneity
in the determination of painters￿compensation. Moreover, unlike in the standard literature in
labor economics (see, for example, AKM, 1999), in which each ￿rm could be classi￿ed into a
single industry only, our data allow us to identify sectors and patrons disjointly since each patron
1We should emphasize that, rather than wages (for instance annual wages, as in the standard labor market
literature) our data report the price of each single item (painting) produced by each artist. Therefore, we take
the compensation for each painting (i.e., the painting price) as the worker￿ s wage for that commission. In labor
economics terms, we would de￿ne it as a compensation at a piece rate rather than at a time rate.
2Which is true also in the case of highly skilled workers such as the painters of our dataset (e.g., see Bertrand,
Goldin and Katz, 2010).
3For example, Brown and Medo⁄ (1989) discussed all these explanations in their survey.
4See in particular Spear (2010) for an accurate description of the dataset, for art historical considerations on
the general pricing patterns for each genre and on the earnings of the painters.
3could commission paintings belonging to di⁄erent genres (or sectors).5
We ￿nd that most of the inter-genre price di⁄erential is explained by the variation in average
individual heterogeneity across artistic sectors. This suggests that the labor market for painters
was rather competitive and allocated artists between artistic genres to the point of equalizing
the marginal return of di⁄erent genres. We ￿nd some evidence of residual price di⁄erences at
the employer level, though, which we mainly explain in terms of e¢ ciency wage and incentive
mechanisms to induce e⁄ort in the production of artistic quality (e.g., Weiss, 1980; Shapiro and
Stiglitz, 1984). In some cases, as for St Peter￿ s Basilica or major noble families (the Medici, the
Gonzaga and kings), higher prices were paid by some patrons to induce more e⁄ort and to select
highly-talented painters, thus sorting artists into patrons with di⁄erent observed compensation
programs.
We also ￿nd a number of additional results on equilibrium pricing. Some of them are
related to the moral hazard problem emerging in contractual relations in which e⁄ort of the
painters and ￿nal quality of the paintings were not contractable ex ante or veri￿able ex post.
First, in the case of ￿gurative paintings, we show that patrons and artists adopted a typical
solution pointed out in the literature on principal-agent contracts (based on the ￿informativeness
principle￿ of Holmstrom, 1979): prices were made conditional on measurable features of the
paintings which were positively correlated with e⁄ort and quality, one of which was the number
of human ￿gures depicted in the composition. Second, in line with the signalling theory in art
pointed out by Nelson and Zeckhauser (2008), we ￿nd a price premium for paintings destined
to public display as in private chapels (within churches) compared to paintings destined to
private palaces and private collections: signalling ￿magni￿cence￿ with works of high quality
required stronger incentives. Moreover, in line with a basic form of price discrimination, we also
￿nd evidence of quantity discounts for multiple commissions. As a residual result, we emphasize
that the best paid artists (for works of similar objective characteristics and destination) included
famous masters such as Maratta, Pietro da Cortona, Guido Reni, Caravaggio, Vouet, Lorrain and
Poussin. On average, their rewards were increasing with age, consistently with the hypothesis of
experimental innovation of Galenson (2006).6 Overall, this unique dataset on paintings traded
four centuries ago provides one of the ￿rst econometric analysis in support of the fact that a
XVII century market did follow standard economic mechanisms concerning equilibrium pricing
and occupational choices.
5One possible limitation, however, related to applying a labor market perspective to this context may depend
on the fact that the demand for painting/artist expressed by the patrons is a demand for consumption and not for
production. Thus, in our setting, an alternative explanation for the existence of a price di⁄erence at the employer
level (which does not hold in a labor market framework) may depend on some limited capacity at the patron
level.
6For econometric evidence on this in modern art see Galenson and Weinberg (2000, 2001).
4The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 brie￿ y reviews the related literature. Section 3
describes product di⁄erentiation in the market for paintings and the economic hypothesis to be
tested. Section 4 presents the dataset and the sample. Section 5 describes the empirical strategy
and the results. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 Related literature
Our work is related to two main strands of literature, one at the borders between economic
history and art history and one within labor economics focusing on inter-industry (and ￿rms)
compensation di⁄erentials.
Economic history research by Montias (1982, 2002), Chong (1987), De Marchi (1995) and
North (1999) has emphasized the importance of economic incentives in shaping the XVII century
art market, but its focus has been mainly on the Dutch market, which was characterized earlier
by an even deeper specialization in new and di⁄erent genres compared to Italy.7 We still have
substantial data on the prices of paintings sold in auctions (or recorded in inventories) in Dutch
towns during the XVII century,8 but unfortunately, we have virtually no data on the original
contracts between painters and buyers, which makes it impossible to analyze the primary market
of the Dutch golden age.
Less systematic have been the investigations on the Italian art market, mainly for the lack
of comparable data until recently. The traditional studies on the social and economic aspects
of art history have provided wide descriptions of the economic conditions of artists and patrons
and anecdotal evidence on the pricing of paintings and art objects (at least since the work on
the Renaissance art market by Wackernagel, 1938), but without a systematic analysis of the
available data. Only recently, art historical research by O￿ Malley (2005) and Spear and Sohm
(2010) has put together and analyzed datasets on primary sales in the Italian art market during
respectively the Renaissance and Baroque periods, but this analysis presents only descriptive
evidence and does not test economic hypothesis.
In a related work, Etro and Pagani (2012) have analyzed the Venetian market for ￿gurative
paintings in the wider period 1550-1750 through econometric analysis of a unique dataset con-
taining prices derived from the original contracts of painters active in the Venetian Republic.
7This is also due to iconoclasm, which limited commissions of religious subject in churches. In the Netherlands,
landscapes rapidly became the most representative paintings in private collections, and even still lifes were highly
regarded (see Hochstrasser, 2007).
8For instance, in the ￿rst quarter of the century, Chong (1987) records average prices of 27 guilders for still
lifes and genre paintings, 30 and 41 guilders for respectively landscapes and architectural subjects an 48 and 33
guilders for paintings of respectively historical and religious subject (with only 6 guilders for portraits).
5This work shows that trade in paintings was su¢ cient to equalize prices between di⁄erent des-
tinations, such as Venice, minor towns and the countryside of the Venetian Republic or foreign
destinations (exports), which suggests that competition between painters eliminated pro￿table
opportunities associated with demand di⁄erences in di⁄erent geographical markets. Moreover, it
provides support for the Galenson hypothesis of a positive relation between age of experimental
artists and quality as priced by the market (see Galenson and Weinberg, 2000, 2001, and Galen-
son, 2006). These results are also con￿rmed in a limited dataset about altarpieces (￿gurative
paintings of sacred subject destined to churches) from Central Italy (namely Florence, Bologna,
Rome and Naples) during the Baroque age.
The second stream of related literature regards wage di⁄erentials in contemporary labor
markets. Generally speaking, the existing evidence shows that large wage di⁄erentials across
sectors and across ￿rms for observationally similar workers and jobs can be hardly explained
on the basis of competitive theories of the labor market. The early literature on the inter-
industry wage di⁄erentials (among others see Dickens and Katz, 1987; Murphy and Topel, 1987;
Krueger and Summers, 1988; Gibbons and Katz, 1992; Haisken-DeNew and Schmidt, 1997) has
shown that these di⁄erentials persist after controlling for observable worker, job or ￿rm char-
acteristics.9 However, there is controversy regarding the extent to which they can be explained
by unobservable worker e⁄ects. For example, Krueger and Summers (1988) found evidence
that inter-industry wage di⁄erentials remain even after controlling for constant and unmeasured
worker characteristics (ability). They relied on e¢ ciency wage theories as an explanation for this
result, suggesting that workers in high wage industries receive non-competitive rents. Murphy
and Topel (1987) looked at workers switching job and found no inter-sectoral wage di⁄erentials;
however, their result may depend on the selection concerning workers that switch jobs. Ac-
cording to Dickens and Katz (1987), e¢ ciency wage mechanisms are likely to explain most of
the inter-sectoral wage di⁄erentials. More recently, AKM (1999) readdress the topic of wage
di⁄erentials by using unique longitudinal matched employer-employee data based on the labor
market in France. Given the matched nature of their panel, they can control simultaneously
for workers and ￿rms heterogeneity, and they ￿nd that most of the inter-industry wage di⁄er-
ential is explained by worker e⁄ects. A possible limit of their empirical analysis relies in the
pervasiveness of unionization and collective bargaining in the modern French labor market. We
perform a similar analysis in a historical market without any e⁄ective unionization between
workers (guilds existed but they hardly a⁄ected pricing behavior) and characterized by direct
bargaining between any couple of worker and employer for every single job. The advantage of
9A related literature is about the positive relation between size of ￿rms and wages within sectors (see Mellow,
1982, and Brown and Medo⁄, 1989).
6Figure 2: Claude Lorrain, landscape: Seaport with the embarkation of Saint Ursula (1641),
National Gallery, London
analyzing a primary artistic market through a matched employer (patron)-employee (painter)
dataset is that we can observe workers (painters) that are constantly switching between sectors
(genre of paintings) and between employers (patrons). Moreover, we are able to identify sec-
tors and patrons disjointly, since each patron could commission paintings belonging to di⁄erent
genres (or sectors).10
Our main contribution, however, is related to the speci￿c features and to the novelty of
our data which allow us to analyze, for the ￿rst time, an historical labor market of high skilled
workers.
10In labor terms, sector or industry is a characteristics of the ￿rm, thus the de￿nition of the pure industry e⁄ect
(for example in AKM) is simply the correct aggregation of the pure ￿rm e⁄ect within the industry.
73 Price equalization between genres of paintings
Most paintings during Renaissance were of ￿gurative subject, mainly religious or mythological,
but also allegorical, literary or strictly historical (including battles drawn from a real or invented
context), and we de￿ne these as ￿gurative paintings in general. Since the end of the XVI cen-
tury, however, the raising demand of private buyers of the high and middle classes (and the
in￿ uence of Flemish art) led to the development of new artistic ￿elds (genres). The pressure for
horizontal di⁄erentiation induced even additional specialization within genres, leading to special
submarkets for still lifes of ￿ owers, fruits (as in Fig. 3), game, ￿sh or trompe-l￿ oeil and so on,
to submarkets for landscapes focused on seascapes, rural scenes, views of the countryside with
classic ruins, vedute (cityscapes), on capricci (imaginary views) and more, or genre paintings
focused on high class life, low class life or bambocciate (grotesque situations).11 Many painters
were mainly, but not exclusively, specialized in one of these artistic sectors, others were often
engaged in combinations of them, and many more were switching genres repeatedly in their
careers (think of Caravaggio, Annibale Carracci or Salvator Rosa to cite famous eclectic artists).
This should not be surprising in the Italian artistic tradition because most painters received a
broad initial training on all these subjects since Renaissance time (Wackernagel, 1938). More-
over, competition between painters was ￿erce and painters were ready to adapt to the needs of
the commissioners and change artistic ￿eld in order to win a contract.
While nowadays we are not used to artistic hierarchies based on paintings￿subject, in the
XVII century the prestige of the di⁄erent artistic genres was clearly ranked. The least worthy
subjects were still lifes, imitating reality without idealization (Spear and Sohm, 2010, p. 91).
The position of portraits in this hierarchy was variable, but often at a low level for the alleged
absence of creativity in works aimed at merely copying real human ￿gures. Genre paintings were
equally penalized by the lack of decorum and idealization and the typical focus on the worst
aspects of life, which was considered vile by contemporary artists and critics (Spear and Sohm,
2010, p. 94). Landscapes and (even more) battles were more valuable than these genres, but the
most digni￿ed and worthy subjects were those depicting creative compositions of ideal human
￿gures (Spear and Sohm, 2010, p. 91), like religious or mythological paintings.
Despite some heterogeneity in preferences, there is wide documentary evidence that such
11Genre paintings have a ￿gurative content (include typically a small number of human ￿gures), but they are
traditionally separated from paintings of historical subject for their focus on contemporary life (occasionally also
battles are associated with them in art historical studies).
8a ranking was well understood between art critics,12 art collectors,13 artists and intellectu-
als.14 Later in the century, it was even codi￿ed by the art academies (see for instance FØlibien,
1668).15 The prestige of di⁄erent genres was closely correlated with the fame of painters. The
most acclaimed artists were mainly specialized in historical subjects and they reached the high-
est payments for their paintings, while minor painters were specialized in still lifes and genre
paintings and they received lower fees for their paintings.16
Nevertheless, since the basic training (in di⁄erent genres and techniques) was more or less
common to most painters, as long as the market was competitive and the alternative artistic
genres were open to the entry of new painters, we can hardly imagine that systematic di⁄erences
in prices could persists over time between di⁄erent genres. Painters of di⁄erent talent could
perfectly choose to be active in di⁄erent ￿elds, but if a given painter could earn more by switching
between genres, he would do it whenever a painting in a di⁄erent genre could provide a higher
payment.17 A typical arbitrage argument would then suggest that, after controlling for supply
factors, especially experience and talent (reputation) of painters but also objective characteristics
of the paintings such as size, technique or support, and for demand factors such as the type of
commissioner or the kind of destination, any price di⁄erential between paintings of di⁄erent
genres should disappear.18 In other words, a square meter of painted canvas commissioned to
12The art critic Giulio Mancini (1588-1630), in a famous treatise on painting aimed at noble amateurs, Consid-
erazioni sulla pittura (1619, see Mancini, 1956), explicitly distinguished between categories of paintings based on
the nature of the objects imitated.
13An articulated ranking was stated at the beginning of the century by Vincenzo Giustiniani (1564-1637), a
famous art collector. In a letter, he distinguished twelve ￿categories, concerning the methods of painting and the
rankings of painters￿ with a clear hierarchy (for the English translation of the letter to Theodor Amayden by
Giustiniani see Enggass and Brown, 1970, pp. 16-20). The worst three categories, or ￿methods￿concerned copies.
At a higher level of Giustinani￿ s ranking were portraits and still lifes. At an even higher level he placed di⁄erent
kinds of landscape paintings. The best categories were about ￿gurative paintings, including battles and, a step
above, historical subjects divided in subcategories di⁄erentiated only from a stylistic point of view. Similar views
were expressed by other experts in the following decades, also with minor changes in the perceived ranking.
14Genre paintings and still lifes had been explicitly considered vile subjects by artists such as Andrea Sacchi,
Francesco Albani and Salvator Rosa and intellectuals such as Giovan Pietro Bellori, Giovanbattista Passeri and
Camillo Massimi (Spear and Sohm, 2010, p. 94).
15The hierarchy of genres became a source of intellectual debate in the European art academies as the Accademia
del Disegno in Florence, the Accademia di San Luca in Rome or the AcadØmie des Beaux-Arts in Paris. A shared
view was later codi￿ed in a famous lecture given by the art critic AndrØ FØlibien (1668) at the French Academy.
His in￿ uential hierarchy of the genres, ranked still lifes in the lowest position and ￿gurative paintings at the
highest level.
16Rome attracted many immigrant painters, mainly Dutch and Flemish (for instance Both, Bril, Brueghel and
Honthorst present in our dataset) or French (such as Lorrain, Dughet and Poussin), who were often focused on
the minor genres: mainly still lifes and genre paintings for the Dutch and the Flemish and landscapes for the
French.
17The same emergence of new genres in the Baroque period can only be justi￿ed, from a rational point of view,
with the new economic recognition that minor genres started to deliver to the painters.
18Notice that we are not claiming that each artist was equally good in each genre, because clearly there could
be di⁄erent talents and skills in di⁄erent genres (and specialization could induce improvements in a single genre
and not in the others). Our hypothesis is di⁄erent, and it is that if one could switch between genres, he would do
it whenever a painting in a di⁄erent genre could provide a higher payment. If this was the case, genre di⁄erentials
9the same painter from the same patron under the same conditions should be priced independently
from what it represents.
3.1 Price determinants: the supply-side
To test the hypothesis of price equalization between genres, we need to identify the main supply
and demand factors that may have a⁄ected prices in the market for paintings of Baroque Rome.
On the supply side, the price of paintings depends ￿rst of all on the talent (and the reputation)
of the painter, which is obviously painter-speci￿c and possibly changing with the maturity of
each painter. The latter may re￿ ect an age/earning pro￿le dependent on reputational e⁄ects
emerging with activity in the profession or on actual improvements (artistic innovations perceived
and priced by the market) correlated with experience (Galenson and Weinberg, 2000; Galenson,
2006).19
Other sources of price di⁄erential that derive from the supply side are painting-speci￿c.
The most important is size, which re￿ ects the cost of production, possibly increasing less than
proportionally with dimension because of likely scale economies. A second factor is the originality
of the work: even if the concept of autography was quite di⁄erent from our modern understanding
(plagiarism was not a legal issue), copies, often done by minor painters, could be regarded as
belonging to an inferior genre compared to the original works because they did not require
a preliminary creative activity. A third factor is related to price discrimination. As long as
painters held some market power associated with the di⁄erentiation of their styles within the
profession, they could adopt basic forms of price discrimination toward the patrons: the main
one was given by quantity discounts for multiple commissions, which were quite typical at the
time in all kinds of genres.
The technique adopted could substantially a⁄ect costs of production and prices: compared
to oil paintings, frescoes required a complex preparation (think of ceilings and cupolas, or even
large walls) but also a rapid execution, which could have an ambiguous impact on costs.20 Be-
yond the di⁄erent costs of production, frescoes, which were typical of both ￿gurative paintings
should disappear on average whenever painters were able to switch.
19Speci￿cally, artist e⁄ects are associated with the ￿reputation￿of the artists in the art history literature (Spear
and Sohm, 2010). This is exactly what we capture with the ￿xed e⁄ects in the econometric analysis. We are
thankful to Richard Spear for enlightening comments on this point.
20As Spears (2010) notices, ￿[m]ore data are required before it can be said if it de￿nitely was cheaper to paint
in fresco than oil, not only because there were so many variables in the quality and quantities of pigments used in
di⁄erent jobs, but also because a fresco painter might or might not have been responsible for the cost of preparing
a wall, or an oil painter for buying his canvases and stretcher. I suspect that generally fresco was the cheaper
medium by measure, but even so that does not take into account the overhead of hiring more assistants for
elaborate projects￿(pp. 56-7).
10and landscape paintings, provided a di⁄erent esthetic perception (and commitment due to the
￿xed position) within churches and private residences and, therefore, they could command di⁄er-
ent prices. Whether frescoes were paid more or less than oil paintings remains an open question
to be settled at the empirical level. Finally, in case of oil paintings, the support could also a⁄ect
prices: most oil paintings were executed on canvas, but few others of small size were executed
on copper support or other smooth material (typical of still lifes and landscapes).
3.2 Price determinants: the demand-side
If we move to analyze the demand side, we expect that di⁄erent patrons could have di⁄erent
willingness to pay. Our dataset is rich of information that is useful to identify the patrons
(mainly noble and rich families, kings, churches and other religious institutions) and the purpose
of their commissions (private collections and residences, churches and private chapels within the
churches). This allows us to test for the existence of various incentive mechanisms typical of
labor contracts in the presence of imperfect observability of workers￿e⁄ort and quality. First of
all, some patrons could have higher interest in promoting e⁄ort and quality. Since the reservation
price of painters was increasing in their ability (for instance because better painters had more
outside options), patrons could pay more in order to attract the best painters and avoid adverse
selection (Weiss, 1980). Moreover, in the spirit of an e¢ ciency wage mechanism ￿ la Shapiro
and Stiglitz (1984), we expect that the most susceptible-to-quality patrons were more prone
to provide monetary incentives to induce e⁄ort of the painters against the risk of working for
ordinary patrons o⁄ering standard payments.
Di⁄erent locations for the commissions could generate di⁄erent willingness to pay and con-
sequently di⁄erent incentive mechanisms to induce e⁄ort and quality. In particular, commissions
for private chapels within churches could guarantee high visibility to their patrons in front of
the fellow citizens, of the political and ecclesiastic power (and even of God) and signal what at
the time was called ￿magni￿cence￿ , with high bene￿ts for the patrons: in this sense we can test
a recent theory of signalling ￿ la Spence (1973) applied by Nelson and Zeckhauser (2008) to the
signalling mechanism present in old artistic commissions. According to the Nelson-Zeckhauser
hypothesis, we expect stronger incentive mechanisms to induce quality (and signal magni￿cence)
and higher prices for paintings addressed to family chapels, that is private chapels placed in-
side public churches, compared to common religious commissions (￿nanced by the churches or
other religious institutions) and especially compared to other private commissions which were
not necessarily destined to public display (those for private palaces and collections).
Other speci￿c incentive mechanisms can characterize commissions for ￿gurative paintings.
11One emerges if we look at the patron-artist relationship from the perspective of principal-agent
contracts chosen to maximize the payo⁄ of the patrons taking into account the incentives of
the artists in exerting e⁄ort. The patrons￿payo⁄ could be seen as the di⁄erence between the
bene￿ts obtained with the commissions and the price paid to the artists. In general, the bene￿ts
of the patrons were positively related to the quality of the artworks. Since the latter was not
directly negotiable (and veri￿able), moral hazard was a relevant issue and the optimal patron-
artist contracts had to be based explicitly or implicitly on any veri￿able and measurable feature
of the painting that was correlated with e⁄ort and quality - in line with the ￿informativeness
principle￿￿rst stated by Holmstrom (1979). In the case of ￿gurative paintings, this was possible
through the number of human ￿gures depicted, usually decided in preliminary drawings (we know
that pricing by number of ￿gures became a typical procedure during the early 600s for leading
painters such as Guercino, Domenichino and Guido Reni).21 Of course, the number of ￿gures
was not equivalent to the absolute quality of a painting, but was correlated with it for two main
reasons. First of all, the variety and complexity of the composition of human ￿gures invented
by the artist had a positive, though partial, correlation with quality, and could be summarized
exactly by the number of ￿gures. Second, the same hierarchy of genres provided a link between
number of ￿gures and quality: a higher number of human ￿gures was increasing on average the
space destined in the painting to subjects of higher perceived value (the human ￿gures) and
reducing the space available for subjects of lower quality (background landscapes or decorative
still lifes).22
In conclusion, our hypothesis of price equalization between genres should strictly hold be-
tween still lifes, genre paintings, landscapes, portraits and all the ￿gurative paintings with a
small number of human ￿gures, allowing for increasing price premia when the ￿gurative paint-
ings contained a higher number of ￿gures. To be as conservative as possible, we will de￿ne
￿gurative paintings with a small number of ￿gures as those with at most four human ￿gures,
and verify their price di⁄erential with respect to the other genres. Finally, for a given number of
￿gures we also expect similar prices for ￿gurative paintings of di⁄erent subject such as religious
subject, historical/literary subject, mythological/allegorical subject and battles.
21Guercino claimed to commit to a ￿xed price of 100 scudi per full-lenght ￿gure (50 for half-lenght ￿gure,
25 for heads); however, this could be part of a sophisticated bargaining technique because deviations from this
￿commitment￿were the rule rather than the exception. In a letter of 1628, Guido Reni argued that the low level
painters could not obtain more than 2 or 3 scudi for large life-size ￿gures and ordinary painters could ask at
most 15 scudi per ￿gure, while an extraordinary painter like himself could name his own price on the basis of the
quality of his work independently from size and number of ￿gures (Spear and Sohm, 2010).
22Moreover, painters were often focusing their own e⁄ort on human ￿gures and especially on di¢ cult parts as
the heads, delegating less relevant parts (including background decorations, landscapes and still lifes) to their own
assistants. Accordingly, a higher number of ￿gures was a proxy for a wider direct intervention of the painters in
the overall execution, and consequently for higher quality.
12The arbitrage argument underlying price equalization between artistic genres is the main
hypothesis to be tested. Jointly with it, we will verify another arbitrage argument concerning
price di⁄erentials between di⁄erent city destinations: we expect that prices for paintings destined
to Rome, which was the leading artistic and economic city in Italy, should not be signi￿cantly
di⁄erent from prices of paintings destined to minor towns, to the countryside in Italy and even
of exported paintings, otherwise pro￿table opportunities for painters would have emerged. This
is against the common perception at the time,23 since larger and wealthier art centers as Rome
and foreign capitals were regarded as better paying compared to minor destinations (Spear and
Sohm, 2010). However, from an economic point of view we do not expect price di⁄erentials to
persist after controlling for supply and demand factors.
4 Data
In this and the next section we carry out an empirical analysis in order to test our main hy-
pothesis and the collateral predictions. In Section 4.1 we provide an accurate description of the
dataset and of the variables we use as price determinants in the empirical analysis. Section 4.2
shows some descriptive statistics.
4.1 Description of the dataset
The econometric analysis is based on a unique dataset established at the Getty Research Institute
(the Payments to Artists Database, hereafter PTAD) which documents payments directly made
to artists for the primary market in XVII century Rome (Spear and Sohm, 2010). The dataset
contains approximately a thousand records of payments to artists taking place in Rome between
1576 and 1711 and provides a lot of precious information regarding paintings￿and painters￿
characteristics. To the aim of our analysis, the most valuable characteristic of the PTAD is that
it is a panel matched employer-emploee (patron-painter) dataset. This is a necessary element
in order to assess the extent to which price heterogeneity is related to unmeasured di⁄erences
among painters, namely their artistic talent (artist e⁄ect), or among patrons (patron e⁄ect).
Indeed, unobservable ability is in general a crucial factor of wage determination. This is all
the more so in the labor market for artists, where the aesthetic value of the artwork, mainly
dependent on painter￿ s talent, is one of the key determinant of its price.
23In 1625, Fra Atansio, an art dealer who was negotiating an altarpiece by Giovanni Battista Crespi called
Cerano in Milan, told the patron that the painter would have probably accepted 250 scudi, but also that if
Cerano were to go to Rome he would be paid double because, he added, Rome is ￿where you go to get rich￿
(Spear and Sohm, 2010, p. 233).
13Figure 3: Caravaggio, still life: Basket of fruits (about 1599), Pinacoteca Ambrosiana, Milan
14The source of the information includes original contracts between artists and patrons (typ-
ically for the altarpieces),24 records of the buyers themselves (typically for the minor genres,
which were not contracted in detail), evidence from contemporary writers, archives and inven-
tories. The survival of all this information for these painters and patrons through centuries is
random, but it is quite reasonable that most of the information actually concerns well known
painters dealing with famous and wealthy patrons. Therefore, we need to be aware that this
selection excludes from the analysis the lower end of the art market, which was populated by
largely undistinguished craftsmen supplying low quality products without any formal agreement
with the buyers. On the other hand, such selection allows us to focus on the upper end of the
art market where the most famous painters were directly competing with each other.25
In PTAD, the information of a typical ￿arrangement￿between the artist and the patron
concerns the record￿ s number, the artist￿ s name, the title, the subject, the object, the dimension,
the number of ￿gures, the patron￿ s name, the payment date, the price paid and the destination
(both the original and the current one). Finally, the records often contain interesting notes
providing further details on the contract, when available. Table 1 describes the structure of the
typical arrangement in PTAD.
INSERT TABLE 1
The original records in the dataset could refer either to a single or to a multiple commission
(i.e., more than one painting for the same artist-patron contract). When multiple commissions
are taken into account, the total number of single observations increases to about a thousand and
￿ve hundred observations. Whether a painting belongs to a single or to a multiple commission is
generally explicitly indicated in its title. Knowing the number of paintings for each commission
enable us to control for a possible discount premium. The painting￿ s title also reports whether
each painting represents a copy rather than an original work.
The painting￿ s price is the dependent variable of our econometric analysis. The value given
is the amount paid to the artist in silver scudi romani; in some cases prices were converted
from another currency (such as doubloons, gold scudi, livres tournois, spanish real and pound
sterling).26 In the rare cases in which prices do not represent an original payment to an artist
they are identi￿ed as evaluation prices or sale prices. In these cases, however, prices are restricted
24See Cavazzini (2010) on the frequency of written contracts during the XVII century in Rome.
25The dataset presents quite a few missing values, which in fact markedly reduced the total number of available
observations. More speci￿cally, we decided to delete all the records containing simultaneous missing information
on the subject (or genre), title and dimension. However, in order to obtain a number of observations as large as
possible we decided to make a few guesses regarding the missing values of a given variable, provided that all the
other crucial information was certain. All these guesses are described more precisely in an Appendix which will
be available on request.
26The main source for prices conversion is Martini (1983).
15to the years when the artist was selling his works because they are probably more representative
of a painting￿ s value than after his death.27 It should be borne in mind that many payments
were made in kind (with wine, wheat, cheese, diamonds, even ￿ owers and marzipan): typically
their equivalent cash value was cited in the documents and reported in PTAD.
In PTAD, the ￿subject￿is identi￿ed as: sacred, mythological, allegorical, history, heraldic,
literary, battle, landscape, architectural, portrait, genre, still life or animals. In order to obtain
variables with an easier interpretation and to link with the traditional artistic subject classi￿-
cation, we aggregated more homogeneous genres among themselves. As a result we obtained
the following classi￿cation: 1) Sacred, 2) Myth (mythological and allegory), 3) History (history,
literary and heraldic), 4) Battle, 5) Landscape (landscape and architectural), 6) Portrait, 7)
Genre, 8) Still life (still life and animal). We de￿ned the ￿rst four groups as belonging to the
￿￿gurative￿genre, as they involved traditional compositions of idealized human ￿gures. The
number of ￿gures is also given for the ￿gurative paintings: the full-￿gure equivalent is reported
as a speci￿c number only when the number of ￿gures is lower than ￿ve, while full-￿gure equiv-
alents are more generally designated ￿5-10￿when they vary between ￿ve and ten and ￿crowd￿
when they are greater than ten or impossible to count.28
In the dataset, the ￿object￿refers to both the technique and the support used by the artist.
The former includes drawings, etching, fresco, mosaic, oil, tapestry, tempera, watercolor; the
latter includes canvas, copper, mirror, lapis, panel, slate, stucco and touchstone. The object also
indicates whether a painting was ￿Easel￿ , which is used to designate what might also be called
a gallery picture and which could be taken as an indirect information for its relatively small size
when e⁄ective size is missing in the dataset. To guarantee a basic homogeneity in the objects
under investigation, we dropped the observations when the object referred to drawings, mosaics,
tapestries, and watercolors. We do have a few observations for oil paintings with a support
di⁄erent form canvas and characterized by a smooth and compact surface (mostly copper, but
also mirror, lapis, wood panel, and others). As a control for the paintings￿ s features we included
dummies for oil paintings not on canvas and for frescoes. The dimension has been converted in
square meters. In some cases the available information is only about one side of the paintings and
some other times only the information ￿small￿ , ￿medium￿ , ￿large￿or only the size of the frame
are given. In all these circumstances an appropriate estimate was made (sometimes considering
the distribution of size of comparable subjects in the sample).
27Since most artists in PTAD (with the notable exception of Artemisia Gentileschi) are male we will use the
male pronoun throughout all this work.
28In PTAD, data were assembled with the method for ￿gure counting used by the Deputies of the Cappella del
Tesoro di San Gennaro in Naples in the 1630s. Other than counting what obviously were full or half ￿gures, they
counted a certain number of putti as the equivalent of a full ￿gure.
16The artist￿ s name could either be the name of a single artist or of more artists, that we
considered as co-painters. The artist￿ s name allows us both to control for her talent (by including
artist ￿xed-e⁄ects) and also to discriminate among painters according to their origin (local or
immigrant). Moreover, since the payment date is reported in the dataset, by looking at the
painters￿biographies we derived the age of the painters at the time in which the artwork was
made.
As demand factors are concerned, in most cases we have information on the patron￿ s name,
which indicates the person or the institution that commissioned the painting. Patrons could be
churches, other religious institutions (e.g., confraternity or religious orders), the papal Basilica
of Saint Peter or private patrons. These latter were generally noble families residing in Rome,
as in the case of the Barberini or the Chigi family, or in other Italian towns, as for the Gonzaga
family in Mantua or the Medici family in Florence. Sometimes even the Popes active during
the century directly commissioned paintings. Demand for paintings originated also from foreign
patrons, both nobles and kings such as Charles I of England or Louis XIV of France. Finally,
paintings were occasionally bought by rich dealers or bankers.
The ￿destination￿in the dataset indicates both the city and the speci￿c location the artwork
was addressed to. The majority of paintings was commissioned for the city of Rome. However,
the dataset contains many paintings for other important Italian towns, such as Bologna, Flo-
rence, Mantua or Naples, for minor provincial centres (such as Ariccia or Viterbo) and also for
foreign European destinations, such as London, Madrid or Paris. The variable destination allows
us also to distinguish between religious and secular locations. Within religious locations we are
able to discriminate between the case in which the painting was placed in a family chapel inside
a church or in a public space within the church. Secular locations can be private palaces or
private collections. Therefore, overall demand side can be controlled for by patron ￿xed-e⁄ects
and by looking both at the city where the paintings was addressed to and at the place where the
painting was planned to be positioned. This variable is likely related to the willingness to pay
of the patrons. Table A1, in the Appendix, contains the details of the de￿nitions and sources of
the variables included in the regressions.
4.2 Descriptive statistics of the dataset
The following descriptive analysis is based on the observations remaining after ￿ltering data
from missing values and other problems (remaining with 1133 observations). The distribution
by genre is shown in Table 2. Notice that the sacred subjects make the largest share of the
market, covering almost half of overall sample. Altogether ￿gurative paintings (i.e. sacred,
17battle, historical, and mythological subjects) represent over 60% of the sample. Around 20% are
landscapes, while portraits and still lifes are less than 9% each. At last we ￿nd genre paintings,
with just 2.4% of observations.
INSERT TABLE 2
The average price of paintings is 144 scudi, although prices exhibit a large variation, ranging
between 1 scudo romano for some still lifes and portraits to the 14,000 scudi of the huge fresco
by Gaulli ￿Triumph of the Name of Jesus￿located in the Roman church Il Gesø (see Fig. 4).
In spite of few observations with prices above 1,000 scudi, 90% of the paintings are priced less
than 300 scudi, while the median value is 48. There are some noticeable di⁄erences between the
average prices by genre. The highest values are observed for ￿gurative paintings with historical
and sacred subjects at the top followed by mythological and allegorical subjects and by battles
at the bottom. Landscapes follow next with a value of 65 scudi while portrait, genre paintings
and still lifes are the least priced.
The range of variation by dimension is large, with very small paintings measuring less
than half square meter up to the majestic ￿Glori￿cation of the Reign of Pope Urban VIII￿ ,
a 363 square meters ceiling fresco by Pietro da Cortona located in Barberini Palace in Rome.
However, apart from few very large paintings, the average dimension is slightly more than 5
square meters while the median is just 2 square meters. Considering genres, the data show that
the average dimension is between 1 and 2 square meters for all non-￿gurative paintings. The
average dimension is instead more than 8 square meters in the case of ￿gurative paintings.29
Popes account for more than 5% of the whole demand, while around 8% came from religious
institutions (excluding St Peter￿ s Basilica that alone covered 3.3% of the sample). The paintings
were demanded mainly for private locations, particularly private collections (62%). Around one
quarter of paintings in the sample was instead addressed to churches, in same cases sponsored by
private families for their own chapels inside public churches (6.7%). Demand originated mainly
from Rome, but also from other important Italian towns (16%), minor centres in Italy (8%) and
others outside Italy (6%) with large price di⁄erentials for di⁄erent destinations. About 6% of
the paintings were exported outside Italy.
INSERT TABLE 3
Turning ￿nally to painters, the PTAD dataset contains 113 artists. The mean and median
age at which paintings are done is 43 years, almost uniformly distributed among genres. More
29When considering ￿gurative paintings, an important attribute to consider is the number of ￿gures depicted.
The largest share of paintings (almost 50%) have a low number of ￿gures (from 1 to 4), around one third have
an intermediate value (between 5 and 10) while only 17% of ￿gurative paintings contain more than 10 ￿gures.
18Figure 4: Gaulli: Triumph of the holy name of Jesus (1676-1679), vault fresco, Il Gesø, Rome
19interesting evidence can actually be obtained if we look at the artists￿specialization by genre
in Table 4. While most artists were engaged in multiple or all kind of genres, it is important to
verify to what extent this occurs for the works of our dataset. Ignoring the distinction of the
￿gurative genre in its components (sacred, myth, history and battle), we still ￿nd 30 artists,
namely 27% of the total, that painted works of di⁄erent genres. For 21 of them (19% of the
sample) we observe two genres. All of these painted ￿gurative paintings in addition to another
genre. Finally, 9 artists diversi￿ed their activity in more than two genres within the dataset.
Also in this case all of them painted ￿gurative paintings in addition to two other genres. The
remaining artists (83) are specialized in a single genre in the dataset, which in the majority
of cases (58) is ￿gurative paintings. Every portraitist in the dataset did paint other genres as
well, while the highest specialization is found for still lifes (11 out of 15 artists painting still lifes
did not paint other genres in our dataset). Notice that 27 % of artists are multi-genre but this
corresponds to approximately half of the total number of observations (since they have more
paintings in the dataset on average) and more than half in our empirical analysis (in which we
will only focus on painters with at least two observations). Of course, most of the artists may
have been engaged in multiple or all genres even if this is not reported in our limited sample.
All this strongly supports the fact that painters did diversify their activity.
5 Econometric evidence
We estimate a semi-linear price equation where the natural logarithm of price is regressed on a set
of dummy variables for genres and on a set of other explanatory variables. Moreover, the PTAD
has a matched nature as it relates artist and patron information. This allows us to estimate the
price equation including both painter and patron ￿xed-e⁄ects and hence to evaluate the extent
to which price heterogeneity is related to unmeasured di⁄erences among painters (artist e⁄ect)
or among patrons (patron e⁄ect). However, in order to include both artists and patrons ￿xed
e⁄ects we lost from the sample all the artists and patrons with a single observation, reducing the
number of observations from 1133 to 1061.30 Our sample then comprises a maximum of 1061
paintings for 87 artists and 50 patrons (which reduces in number depending on the explanatory
variables we include due to missing values).
The payment date in PTAD is recorded between 1576 and 1711. In our analysis, however,
we slightly reduced the available observations, focusing only on the XVII century, for artistic
homogeneity (this is commonly studied as the Baroque period in art history) and also for mon-
30Analogous results emerge with a standard OLS regression on the larger sample after introducing a dummy
that puts together the artists with the smallest numbers of observations. Details are available from the authors.
20etary reasons: the real value of the Roman scudo is known to have been stable during that
period (see Spear and Sohm, 2010), which allows us to focus on the nominal prices in silver
coins without loss of generality. We should add that our panel of artists and patrons (over
paintings) is strongly unbalanced as it includes artists with a minimum of 2 observations and a
maximum of 43 observations (like Poussin) and patrons with a minimum of 2 to a maximum of
115 observations (like the Chigi family).
In such a framework, an OLS ￿xed e⁄ect estimator is the natural candidate for estimating
the (log) price of paintings commissioned to an artist i by a patron j, using a set of explanatory
variables (i.e., paintings and artists characteristics) and including both artist and patron ￿xed
e⁄ects. Speci￿cally, we test the following price equation:
pin = ￿ + ￿Xin + ￿i +  j(i;n) + ￿k(j(i;n)) + "in
in which pin is the logarithm of the price paid to an artist i for a painting n, ￿ is a constant, Xin
is a vector of painting-varying exogenous characteristics of both artists and of paintings (per
artist) with coe¢ cient ￿, ￿i is the pure artist e⁄ect,  j(i;n) is the pure patron e⁄ect for the
patron j(i;n) which has commissioned the painting n to the artist i, ￿k(j(i;n)) is the e⁄ect of the
genre k(j(i;n)) - which is related to the painting n which is commissioned to an artist i by a
patron j, and "in is the statistical residual.
The price equation could also be interpreted as a wage equation in which pin is the com-
pensation of a worker i for a painting n, which is regressed on a set of observable characteristics
of the painting and of the workers (experience and origin), on the identity of the individual and
on the identity of the ￿employing￿￿rm. The genre to which each painting belongs could also
be interpreted as the ￿industry￿to which each painting/artist belongs. This enables us to in-
terpret mobility of artists across artistic sectors as an inter-industry workers mobility and prices
di⁄erentials across genres as inter-industry wage (compensation) di⁄erentials. One important
di⁄erence, however, is that while each ￿rm could be classi￿ed into a single industry, here each
patron (￿rm) could commission paintings belonging to di⁄erent genres (industries).
5.1 Results
In the ￿rst column of Table 4, we start by estimating a baseline price equation where the natural
logarithm of price is regressed on dummies for genres in order to highlight the unconditional price
di⁄erential between them. As already shown by descriptive evidence, a sharp ranking of prices
can be detected, with still lifes (the reference category) at the bottom, followed in increasing
21order by portraits and genre paintings, and by landscapes and battles. Figurative paintings are
the best paid artworks, with sacred and mythological subjects with a large number of human
￿gures at the top. We also performed pairwise t test on the equality of coe¢ cients between
still lifes, portraits, genre paintings, landscapes and ￿gurative paintings and we found that they
were all statistically di⁄erent from each other with the only exception of the coe¢ cients of genre
paintings and portraits. This result is in line with the traditional hierarchy of genres and with
the anecdotal evidence according to which the position of portraits in this hierarchy was variable.
Incidentally, this result is also consistent with the descriptive evidence of the dataset reported
in Table 2, where slightly increasing the number of observations is enough to invert the rank
between genre and portrait with respect to the one emerging in the baseline regression.31
The descriptive analysis has shown a large variation of paintings￿size by subject. More
speci￿cally, ￿gurative paintings have a higher average dimension than other subject paintings.
Related studies on the value of old master paintings show that dimension was a crucial de-
terminant of prices (see Etro and Pagani, 2012). Hence, we ￿rstly want to see whether the
price di⁄erential between genres persists after controlling for paintings￿dimension. The second
column shows that indeed it does, con￿rming the price di⁄erential between genres per square
meter, though the relative price premium diminishes for ￿gurative paintings with a large number
of ￿gures.
INSERT TABLE 4
As the following step, in the third column, we control for the full set of paintings￿character-
istics. Results show that the price di⁄erential still exist, although it is reduced: paintings with
the same objective characteristics are di⁄erently paid depending on the subject they represent,
again with still lifes at the bottom and ￿gurative paintings at the top. Prices decrease with
the number of commissioned paintings and in the case of oil paintings that are not painted on
canvases, even though only at the 10% level of signi￿cance; the coe¢ cients for the dummies for
copies and frescoes are negative as well. To control for demand e⁄ects, in this speci￿cation we
also include the geographical destination for which the painting was demanded and the location
where it was planned to be positioned. Quite interestingly, and in line with the common per-
ception at the time, paintings addressed abroad were the most paid, about 120% more than our
reference destination, which is Rome, while paintings commissioned by a minor centre were paid
about 50% less. As the location destination is concerned, we can detect a clear ranking where
commissions for private chapels were by far the best paid, those for churches were ￿intermedi-
31Notice that historical subjects and battles appear to be less paid than other ￿gurative subjects, at least in
compositions with a large number of ￿gures. This is in line with the hierarchy of genres, since idealized subjects
(as religious and mithological subjects) were better considered than realistic (historical) ones.
22ate￿ , and those for private palaces and private collections (the reference category) were at the
bottom. Finally, in this speci￿cation we introduce two macroeconomic explanatory variables.
The ￿rst is the time trend in paintings￿prices, which emphasizes a negative but extremely small
trend.32 The second is a dummy for the decade following the plague of 1656, which is meant
to capture the e⁄ect of the main aggregate shock which may have a⁄ected demand (but also
supply) during the century: the e⁄ect is not signi￿cant. Both these controls will be omitted in
the following speci￿cations, because of multicollinearity of the time trend with the age of the
artists and of the irrelavance of the aggregate shock.
We then add in the fourth column the artist observable characteristics, including the age
of the artists and a dummy for the immigrant painters. The price of paintings increases with
artist￿ s age by around 2% per year, in line with what found by Etro and Pagani (2012) on
a di⁄erent sample in the same period. This may be related to the experimental nature of
most painters (Galenson and Weinberg, 2000) or to a reputational mechanism. Concerning the
provenance of the painters, notice that foreign painters were mainly specialized in minor genres,
which were less paid in absolute terms. However, when controlling for genres, we do not ￿nd any
evidence of price di⁄erentials between Italian and foreign painters (results will not be displayed
in the full speci￿cation due to collinearity with the artists ￿xed e⁄ects). Therefore, in this labor
market for high skilled artists of the XVII century in Italy we do not ￿nd any evidence of price
discrimination between Italian and foreign workers.
In the ￿fth column we replicate this speci￿cation by simply adding patron ￿xed e⁄ects
in order to control for unobservable heterogeneity on the demand side. Results show that
the price di⁄erential between genres still persists, although it is slightly reduced: each patron
did pay on average much more for a ￿gurative painting compared to another painting of the
same size and characteristics but of a di⁄erent genre, exactly because the willingness to pay
for di⁄erent genres was variable according to the hierarchy of preferences for di⁄erent genres in
the Baroque age. Notice, however, that after controlling for patron ￿xed e⁄ects the coe¢ cients
of the geographical destinations become non-signi￿cant at conventional levels, suggesting the
existence of an arbitrage mechanism between destinations with di⁄erent demand (as already
pointed out in Etro and Pagani, 2012). Moreover, we can detect a strong increase in the value
of the R squared which goes from 0.648 to 0.765 (as a matter of fact, the value of the R squared
is constantly increasing throughout the di⁄erent speci￿cations presented in Table 4).
Including only artist ￿xed e⁄ects, in the sixth column, strongly reduces the price di⁄erentials
32Indeed estimating a simple regression of prices over time we can actually detect a slow increase in prices up to
the mid of the century (around 1660). After then and up to end of the century, prices slowly decrease. However,
such e⁄ect is not captured as signi￿cant by inserting a squared trend in this speci￿cation.
23between genres and those coe¢ cient became almost all insigni￿cant, with the exception of all
the coe¢ cients of ￿gurative paintings. We should emphasize that the value of the R squared is
higher in this speci￿cation which contains only the artist ￿xed e⁄ects (i.e., 0.795) with respect
to the previous one where we included only the patron ￿xed e⁄ect. This evidence suggest that
artist e⁄ect are more important than patron e⁄ect to explain price variation.
Estimation results of the full model of our price equation are presented in the last column of
Table 4. This speci￿cation includes both patrons and artists ￿xed-e⁄ect (i.e., their unobservable
characteristics to control for individual talent). The price di⁄erential between still lifes and all
the other genres ￿nally disappears: ceteris paribus, a still life was not paid di⁄erently from a
portrait, a genre painting, a landscape or a ￿gurative painting (with less than ￿ve ￿gures) by
the same painter. Moreover, notice that also any price di⁄erential between ￿gurative paintings
(namely of historical, mythological and sacred subject) with a similar number of ￿gures disap-
pears. This is true for all the three groups of ￿gurative paintings, that is with less than ￿ve
￿gures, with ￿ve to ten ￿gures and with a crowd or more than ten ￿gures (which includes also
all the battles). Therefore, our main hypothesis is fully con￿rmed: the artistic sector choice
of painters led to the equalization of prices. In a sense, if ￿gurative paintings were paid more
in absolute terms, it was mainly because better painters were engaged in ￿gurative paintings.
On the other side, minor painters could not switch from still lifes to ￿gurative paintings to
earn extra pro￿ts because they would have been paid less than other painters, exactly enough
to make them indi⁄erent between genres. Which is exactly what a competitive labour market
would have predicted. Exploiting the analogy between industries and genres we can conclude
that this result is in line with that of AKM (1999) who show that most of the inter-industry
wage di⁄erential is explained by the variation in the average individual heterogeneity across
sectors.33
Moreover, at this stage of the analysis we can comment also on the other ￿nal estimation
results. Starting from the e⁄ect of paintings￿characteristics, we con￿rm previous results regard-
ing the positive link between size and price, with a return above 3% per square meter; moreover,
we ￿nd evidence of decreasing returns given the negative and signi￿cant coe¢ cient of the square
term. The price premium for ￿gurative paintings with a large number of human ￿gures remains
and is statistically signi￿cant: plus 90% for ￿gurative paintings with ￿ve to ten ￿gure and plus
120% for those with more than ten ￿gures.34 This is consistent with our hypothesis that quanti￿-
33After controlling for patrons ￿xed e⁄ects, in the fourth column, the compensation di⁄erential across genres
were actually reduced but person e⁄ects and not ￿rm e⁄ects form the basis here for most of the inter-industry
salary structure (as in AKM).
34Notice that the price premium for ￿gurative paintings with a small number of ￿gures becomes not only
statistically insigni￿cant, but also economically insigni￿cant when we limit the category to a lower number of
￿gures (up to two or three). Incidentally, this would the most proper comparison with portraits that are almost
24able aspects of paintings as the number of ￿gures depicted were agreed (in preliminary drawings
or verbal communications, as we know it happened for Guercino, Guido Reni and others) also
with the purpose of insuring a certain e⁄ort and quality, a sort of incentive mechanism to limit
moral hazard in line with standard principal-agent theory (Holmstrom, 1979).
The dummy on frescoes is negative and signi￿cant: this suggests that the rapid technique
of frescoes, often executed by high quality painters, was compensated with a lower payment
per square meter. Nevertheless, in the absence of further information on the time of execution
of frescoes compared to oil paintings, we cannot draw de￿nitive conclusions on the existence
of compensation di⁄erentials between the two techniques. The coe¢ cients for copies and for
paintings not on canvas are negative and signi￿cant in speci￿cations not controlling for artists￿
characteristics, while in the full speci￿cation they remain negative but they turn non-signi￿cant.
Therefore, copies (or replicas of existing paintings) and paintings on copper and other unusual
supports were not paid less, but they were simply done by worse painters. After all, we are in
front of another equilibrium result: there was nothing to gain or to lose in specializing in copies or
in paintings on a di⁄erent support, otherwise a pro￿table opportunity would have been available.
Finally, the negative coe¢ cient of the variable describing the number of paintings in the single
commission highlights the existence of a quantity discount of around 5% for each additional
painting.
As to demand factors, in the ￿rst place it can be noticed that destinations￿coe¢ cients are
non-signi￿cant and, recalling that Rome is the excluded category, this result highlights that
prices of artworks produced for destinations di⁄erent from Rome where not di⁄erent, ceteris
paribus, from prices of equivalent paintings addressed to other places, including foreign desti-
nations. Moreover, test on the equality of coe¢ cients between all destinations￿pairs show that
they were not statistically di⁄erent from each other. This suggests that high demand cities did
not pay more but simply attracted better painters or demanded paintings by the most talented
artists: arbitrage took place both across sectors (genres) and across geographical markets.
Interesting results concern the impact of the place where the artwork was addressed to.
As a matter of fact, the same patron could have di⁄erent willingness to pay depending on the
place where the painting was planned to be positioned. For instance, patrons often commissioned
paintings for their private chapels within public churches. Obviously these paintings were visible
to all the people attending the church and it was clear that the paintings located in these private
chapels had been ￿nanced by the family to which the chapel was named after. Hence, we
expected that patrons had a particularly high willingness to pay to induce e⁄ort by the artists
always con￿ned to a single ￿gure.
25and obtain high quality in these works compared to those for private palaces and collections
(as emphasized in the signalling theory of Nelson and Zeckhauser, 2008). Our estimates largely
con￿rm this hypothesis: the very high and signi￿cant coe¢ cient for the commissions for private
chapels implies that they were on average more paid than paintings for private collections (the
excluded category) and private palaces; however, the coe¢ cient of private chapel is higher but
not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from that of other religious destinations.
INSERT TABLE 4 (cont￿ d) (patron)
As expected, patrons￿characteristics also a⁄ect prices. Due to the unbalanced nature of our
panel, in Table 4, we report only the coe¢ cients of the patrons with at least eight observations,
since for too few observations it would be di¢ cult to comment on the values of their coe¢ cients.
The reference group is the patron who was paying less, the Sacchetti family (whose average
price was 6 scudi), and so the coe¢ cient of each patron should be interpreted with respect
to the Sacchetti. The patrons who were paying more were, by far, the Gonzaga family, the
Medici￿ s, foreign kings and the Saint Peter￿ s church with a premium of about 300% compared
to the reference group. Then we ￿nd the most important Roman families, such as Barberini,
Borghese, Chigi and Colonna, the popes and all the religious commissions and foreign nobles
who were paying a premium of about 200%.
Interpreting these results from a labor market perspective, however, is not obvious for
many reasons. One reason is that (contrary to ￿rms) the demand for paintings expressed by
the patrons is a demand for consumption and not for production35 and so, in our setting, an
explanation for the existence of a price di⁄erence at the employer level, may depend on some
limited capacity at the patron level. Moreover, it could also be the case that working for some
speci￿c patrons provided to artists alternative types of compensation (i.e., compensating wage
di⁄erentials) such as the opportunity to access to prestigious networks and so to see an increase
in their future earning pro￿le.36 Beyond this, the best interpretation of the results on the
patrons￿coe¢ cients is in terms of e¢ ciency wage mechanisms aimed either at increasing artists￿
e⁄ort (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984) or at selecting better painters (Weiss, 1980). In the case of
Saint Peter and foreign kings, for example, we expect that the motivation to obtain high-quality
artworks was higher than average and also coupled with a larger amount of economic resources
to allocate to art. Then, in order to obtain more e⁄ort, these patrons were willing to pay more
35Nevertheless, paintings at that time should not be classi￿ed strictly as consumer durable goods but they
were also a signal of the patron￿ s status (power). To some extent, religious paintings also represented a form of
intertemporal substitution between present and future consumption (if we interpret them as a tribute to God and
thus as an instrument to gain access to perpetual life).
36That would explain, for example, why a minor family as the Nol￿ was paying more than the Barberini or the
Chigi families.
26than ordinary patrons. The same could hold for selected leading families, while minor families
and other patrons were paying ordinary wages so as to create a sort of artistic duality in this
labor market.
INSERT TABLE 4 (cont￿ d) (artist)
Finally, let us move to the painters￿characteristics. The price of paintings increases with
artist￿ s age by around 2% per year, in line with what found by Etro and Pagani (2012) on a
di⁄erent sample. This may be related to the experimental nature of most painters (Galenson
and Weinberg, 2000) or to a reputational mechanism. As we did for patrons, in Table 5 we also
report the coe¢ cients of the artists with at least eight observations in the estimation sample. In
this case the coe¢ cient of each artist should be interpreted in absolute terms rather than with
respect to a reference group.37 Results show that some of the most famous painters of the time
were the best paid: ￿rst of all the main masters of the typical Baroque art as Carlo Maratta,
Pietro da Cortona and Guido Reni, mainly engaged in ￿gurative paintings, but also painters
active in multiple genres such as Caravaggio, who is actually responsible for the introduction of
genre paintings and still lifes in Rome, and the French painter Simon Vouet. Between the best
paid painters we also ￿nd two other French painters, Nicolas Poussin and Claude Lorrain, who
were mainly engaged in landscape paintings.38
5.2 Robustness checks
As a robustness check, in Table 5 we present the results of a regression in which we limited the
data to the paintings of the ￿switchers￿ , that is the painters that in the dataset have paintings
in more than one genre.39 In fact, if all artists were strictly specialized in a single genre, by
simply adding a dummy for each artist to the dummies for genres would explain why the inter-
genre price di⁄erential goes away. To the contrary, the main assumption underlying our result
is that the painters, or some of them, could switch their activity between di⁄erent genres to
exploit any pro￿table opportunities, which implies that such opportunities should disappear in
equilibrium. An immediate implication of this is that price equalization should strictly hold
for all the painters that do diversify within our dataset: we can verify this by restricting the
empirical analysis to the painters that have actually switched between more than one genre
within our dataset. The results presented in Table 5 reinforce our main conclusion regarding the
37The artist ￿xed e⁄ects are estimated using the areg estimator which ￿ts a linear regression absorbing one
categorical factor.
38Notice that even painters who were often engaged in battles (Salvator Rosa) and portraits (Leoni) are well
ranked after controlling for all the paintings￿and patrons￿features.
39Table 3 shows that, in the dataset, the paintings of the artists belonging to more than one genre cover about
half of all the paintings.
27validity of the price equalization between genres hypothesis. Incidentally, we know that most
of the painters who have a single genre in the dataset did paint also other genres (not in the
dataset), and we con￿rmed the hypothesis of price equalization between genres also when we
took only them in consideration (results are available on request).
INSERT TABLE 5
Finally, in Table A2, in the Appendix, we show the results of three speci￿cations which are
meant to show the di⁄erent role of genres, patrons and artists in explaining price variation of
paintings. More speci￿cally, we have regressed the (log) price of paintings over all the paintings
and artist characteristics and, one at a time, we have included genres, patrons and painters. The
value of the R squared is the highest in the column which contains the artist ￿xed e⁄ects (third
column in Table A2). This is in line with what previously found by AKM (1999) in a di⁄erent
context, namely that artist e⁄ects are more important than patron and genre e⁄ects to explain
price variation of paintings.
6 Conclusions
We analyzed the labor market in the Baroque Roman art sector using a unique matched painter-
patron panel dataset on commissions for still lifes, landscapes, portraits, genre paintings, battles
and sacred, mythological and historical paintings. In line with the traditional hierarchy of
genres, price di⁄erential between them was high and signi￿cant. Adopting a labor economics
perspective we were able to analyze the inter-industry (genre) compensation di⁄erentials taking
into account the role of individual and employer heterogeneity in the determination of workers￿
compensation. We found that most of the inter-genre price di⁄erential is explained by the
variation in average individual heterogeneity across sectors (genres). This suggests that the labor
market for painters was rather competitive at the industry level and allocated artists between
artistic genres to the point of equalizing the marginal return of di⁄erent genres. For each painter,
every commission from a patron for a still life, a portrait, a genre painting, a landscape or a
comparable ￿gurative painting was equally pro￿table at the margin. This re￿ ected an e¢ cient
equilibrium of occupational choice and, incidentally, made it possible for the new artistic genres
to develop and ￿ ourish in this and the following centuries.
Future research could analyze data from the earlier Italian art market, namely Renaissance,
and from the contemporary Dutch and Flemish market. The former is interesting for the analysis
of the ￿gurative paintings, to verify whether the trends emphasized here for the Baroque age are
common to the earlier period. The latter is interesting for analyzing price di⁄erentials between
28artistic sectors in a di⁄erent context.40 A look at the commissions for sculptures or other artistic
products for which data are available could also be fruitful to con￿rm some of our insights.
Finally, in a Schumpeterian perspective, it would be interesting to investigate whether
di⁄erent compensations a⁄ected artistic innovations in certain locations or certain periods of
art history: it was not by chance that artistic innovation ￿ ourished ￿rst in the wealthiest cities
characterized by more developed free market economies, as the one examined here.
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31Table 1:  typical record in PTAD
PI Record  No.P-264 
Artist Name  CARAVAGGIO, MICHELANGELO MERISI DA 
Title  Martyrdom of St. Matthew; Calling St. Matthew 
Subject Sacred 
Object Type  Oil (chapel laterals)
Dimensions  322 x 343 cm; 323 x 340 cm
Figures 5-10;  crowd
Patron Name  Estate of Cointrel, Mathieu, Cardinal 
Payment Date  1599-1600
Price Paid  400 scudi for two paintings 
City (Destination)  Rome, S. Luigi dei Francesi, Contarelli chapel Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of the original Dataset (1133 obs)
Still Portrait Genre Landscape Battle Myth Sacred History
9 93 2 1374 5 3
Still Portrait Genre Landscape Battle Myth Sacred History
17 39 25 66 73 202 242 262
Still Portrait Genre Landscape Battle Myth Sacred History
1.1 1.9 1.4 1.9 1.5 15.3 7.3 11.5
Low (1-4) Medium (5-10) High (crowd)
49 33 17
Not on canvas support  Fresco  Copy
67 3
Rel other King Foreign noble St Peter Pope Church Private families
0.7 1 2 3.3 5 7 81
Private chapel Private palace Church  Private collection
6.7 12 19 62
Foreign Rome  Medium Minor
67 0 1 6 8
Foreign Rome  Medium Minor
238 146 137 127
Genre distribution (%)




Average price by genre (in scudi romani)
Object type distribution (%)
Average size by genre (in square meters)
Number of figures distribution (%)Table 3: Artist Specialization by Genre
1 2 3 Total
No. of artist 83 21 9 113
of which:
Stilllife 11 1 3 15
Genre 3249
Landscape 11 5 6 22
Portrait 0 13 5 18
Figurative 58 21 9 88
% observations 53 26 21 100
Number of genresTable 4: Log Price determination
Baseline Baseline With paintings With artist With only With only With patron 
with size characterstics  characterstics  patron FE artist FE & artist FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Still life (omitted)
Portrait 0.631*** 0.592*** 0.530*** 0.726*** 0.596*** -0.283 -0.349
(4.099) (3.894) (3.745) (4.995) (3.894) (-0.752) (-0.877)
Genre 0.674*** 0.668*** 0.591*** 0.518** 0.437** 0.002 -0.030
(3.212) (3.267) (2.924) (2.237) (1.983) (0.00539) (-0.0751)
Landscape 1.383*** 1.338*** 1.092*** 1.098*** 0.864*** 0.062 0.308
(9.643) (9.416) (7.915) (7.255) (4.795) (0.156) (0.699)
Figurative (< 5 fig) 1.901*** 1.770*** 1.360*** 1.468*** 1.268*** 0.588* 0.534
(13.27) (12.17) (8.870) (9.785) (7.378) (1.684) (1.446)
Sacred < 5 (omitted)
History < 5 0.090 0.129 0.086 0.011 0.019 -0.240 0.003
(0.532) (0.888) (0.387) (0.0463) (0.0996) (-0.826) (0.00997)
Myth < 5 -0.211 -0.193 0.040 -0.020 0.072 -0.018 0.100
(-1.292) (-1.231) (0.211) (-0.105) (0.370) (-0.0933) (0.488)
Figurative (5-10 fig)  2.886*** 2.572*** 1.934*** 1.994*** 1.636*** 1.100*** 0.912**
(19.53) (17.31) (12.23) (12.83) (9.227) (3.126) (2.457)
Sacred 5-10 (omitted)
History 5-10 -0.716*** -0.506** -0.107 0.001 0.009 -0.111 0.004
(-3.213) (-2.202) (-0.442) (0.00585) (0.0395) (-0.620) (0.0211)
Myth 5-10 -0.154 0.011 -0.010 -0.037 -0.243 -0.042 -0.354
(-0.365) (0.0264) (-0.0260) (-0.108) (-0.863) (-0.142) (-1.243)
Figurative (>10 fig) 3.439*** 2.586*** 2.045*** 2.304*** 1.858*** 1.365*** 1.183***
(14.10) (10.83) (9.152) (10.53) (8.073) (3.506) (2.811)
Sacred >10 (omitted)
History >10 -1.192*** -0.506 -0.113 -0.264 -0.175 -0.121 -0.000
(-2.961) (-1.311) (-0.389) (-0.817) (-0.721) (-0.271) (-0.000892)
Myth >10 0.124 -0.249 0.407 0.173 0.380 0.231 0.413
(0.353) (-0.792) (1.341) (0.585) (1.140) (0.622) (1.155)
Battle >10 -2.169*** -1.334*** -0.822** -1.057*** -0.941*** -0.123 -0.282
(-6.207) (-3.942) (-2.427) (-3.136) (-3.730) (-0.340) (-0.837)
Size 0.053*** 0.044*** 0.039*** 0.034*** 0.037*** 0.032***
(5.854) (5.302) (4.615) (4.576) (3.681) (3.153)
Size^2 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
(-4.557) (-4.261) (-3.630) (-3.427) (-3.091) (-2.737)
# commissions -0.016* -0.026*** -0.099*** 0.005 -0.049**
(-1.851) (-3.019) (-5.318) (0.568) (-1.997)
Copy -0.556** -0.797*** -0.996*** 0.024 -0.177
(-2.381) (-2.869) (-4.420) (0.0851) (-0.799)
Not on canvas -0.284* -0.309** -0.435*** -0.201 -0.280
(-1.824) (-2.046) (-2.850) (-0.998) (-1.379)
Fresco -0.213 -0.087 -0.472** -0.218 -0.396**
(-1.396) (-0.534) (-2.317) (-1.119) (-2.053)
Private chapel 1.517*** 1.697*** 0.797*** 1.112*** 0.686**
(8.396) (9.429) (3.318) (6.589) (2.276)
Church and other rel  0.855*** 0.851*** 0.514*** 0.846*** 0.645***(6.559) (6.688) (3.239) (6.300) (4.217)
Private palace 0.294** 0.429*** 0.287 0.331** 0.557***
(2.172) (2.992) (1.572) (2.539) (3.205)
Private collection (omitted)
Minor destinations -0.492*** -0.432*** -0.105 -0.151 0.109
(-3.330) (-2.920) (-0.477) (-0.900) (0.524)
Medium destinations 0.474*** 0.445*** 0.215 0.279** 0.023
(4.329) (3.998) (1.033) (2.425) (0.140)
Exports 1.163*** 0.868*** 0.328 0.544*** 0.286
(7.451) (5.158) (1.210) (2.608) (1.312)
Rome (omitted)
Age of artist  0.021*** 0.018*** 0.016*** 0.018***







Constant 2.204*** 2.145*** 12.503*** 1.270*** 1.136*** -0.142 -1.742***
(19.05) (18.74) (4.507) (6.621) (4.401) (-0.895) (-2.843)
Observations 867 831 732 732 732 732 732
R-squared 0.419 0.477 0.631 0.648 0.765 0.795 0.852
Robust t-statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1Table 4 (cont'd): Log Price determination
Patron with at least 8 obs. in the est. sample With patron  Patron (cont'd) With patron 
& artist FE & artist FE
Aldobrandini 1.805*** Ruffo 2.196***
(4.436) (4.929)
Altemps 1.718** Vatican St. Peter 2.913***
(2.491) (6.476)






































Robust t-statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1Table 4 (cont'd) : Log Price determination
Artists with at least 8 obs. in the est. sample With patron  Artist (cont'd) With patron 
& artist FE & artist FE
Arpino 0.479 Lorrain 1.148**
(0.777) (1.997)
Baglione 0.295 Maratti 1.382**
(0.432) (2.439)
Belloni -0.631 Mattia -0.163
(-0.957) (-0.291)
Both 0.656 Mei 0.637
(1.140) (1.228)
Bril -0.282 Morandi 0.293
(-0.437) (0.512)
Camassei 0.258 Nuzzi -0.411
(0.416) (-0.851)
Caravaggio 1.103** Pace -0.099
(2.018) (-0.217)
Cerquozzi 0.314 Poussin 0.983*
(0.504) (1.638)
Courtois -0.399 Reni 0.962*
(-0.672) (1.739)
Cortona 1.171** G. Romanelli 0.672
(2.065) (1.233)
V. de Boulogne 0.733 Rosa 0.964
(1.278) (1.376)
Domenichino 0.404 G. Sacchi 0.871
(0.701) (1.471)
Dughet -0.222 Salini -1.074
(-0.360) (-1.540)
Ferri 0.555 Stanchi 0.466
(1.003) (0.969)
F. Napoletano 0.324 Tempesta -0.255
(0.548) (-0.392)



















































Robust t-stat. in parentes *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1Table A1: Variables Definitions 
Variables Definition 
VARIABLES OF INTEREST: 
GENRE and NUMBER of FIGURES 
Still lifes  Dummy =1 for a still life   
Landscapes  Dummy =1 for a landscape  
Genre paintings  Dummy = 1 for a genre  
Portraits  Dummy = 1 for a portrait  
Figurative paintings (1-4 fig)  Dummmy = 1 for a “figurative painting” (i.e., Sacred or History or Myth) with 1 to 4 fig. 
Sacred (1-4 figures)  Interaction Sacred * Figurative (1 to 4 figures) 
Historical & Literary (1-4 fig)  Interaction Histoy * Figurative (1 to 4 figures) 
Mythological & Allegory (1-4 fig)  Interaction Myth * Figurative (1 to 4 figures) 
Figurative paintings (5-10 fig)  Dummmy = 1 for a “figurative painting” (i.e., Sacred/History/Myth) with 5 to 10 fig. 
Sacred (5-10 fig)  Interaction Sacred * Figurative (5 to 10 figures) 
Historical & Literary (5-10 fig)  Interaction Histoy * Figurative (5 to 10 figures) 
Mythological & Allegory (5-10 fig)  Interaction Myth * Figurative (5 to 10 figures) 
Figurative paintings (>10 fig)  Dummmy = 1 for a “figurative painting” (i.e., Sacred/History/Myth) with > 10 fig. 
Sacred (>10 fig)  Interaction Sacred * Figurative (> 10 figures) 
Historical & Literary (>10 fig)  Interaction Histoy * Figurative (> 10 figures) 
Mythological & Allegory (>10 fig)  Interaction Myth * Figurative (> 10 figures) 
Battles  Interaction Battle* Figurative (> 10 figures) 
CONTROL VARIABLES: 
PAINTINGS CHARACTERISTICS 
Size (square meters)   Size in square meters  
Size (square meters) squared   Size in square meters squared 
Number of commissioned paintings   Number of paintings for single and multiple commission 
Copy from original   Dummy= 1 for a copy form original 
Not on canvas   Dummy= 1 for paintings on a support different form canvas (e.g. copper etc) 
Fresco   Dummy= 1 for frescos 
CITY DESTINATIONS   
Rome   Dummy = 1 for destination Rome 
Minor destinations   Dummy = 1 for destination to minor Italian town  
Medium destinations   Dummy = 1 for destination to major Italian town  
Exports  Dummy = 1 for foreign destination   LOCATION DESTINATIONS   
Private palace  Dummy = 1 for destination private palace  
Private collection  Dummy = 1 for destination private collection 
Private chapel  Dummy = 1 for destination private palace  
Church and other religious buildings  Dummy = 1 for destination church and other rel. buildings 
PATRONS FIXED EFFECTS 
Private families  Dummy = 1 when patrons are private families with at least 2 observations in the sample  
Kings' commission  Dummy = 1 when the patron is a king 
Foreign nobles   Dummy = 1 when the patron is a foreign noble 
Churches  Dummy = 1 when the patrons are urban churches 
Vatican St. Peters  Dummy = 1 when the patron is the Vatican St. Peter  
Pope's commission  Dummy= 1 when the patron is a Pope  
Other religious institutions  Dummy = 1 for other religious commissions 
ARTISTS CHARACTERISTICS and FIXED EFFECTS 
Artists  Dummy =1 for artists with at least 2 observations 
Age of artist  Difference between payment date and year of birth 
Immigrant   Dummy =1 for artists coming from outside Italy  
OTHER   
Time trend  Payment date 
Plague  Dummy = 1 for the period 1656 1665 (aggregate demand shocks) 
 
 Table A1 (cont’d): Variable Definition 
ARTISTS  PRIVATE FAMILIES  DESTINATIONS 
Abbatini Mola  Aldobrandini  MINOR: 
Alberti Morandi  Altemps  Ariccia 
Arpino Nuzzi  Altieri  Bagnaia 
Baderni  Pace  Barberini  Bassano di Sutri 
Baglione Passerotti  Borghese  Bassano  Romano 
Belloni Pellegrini  Bornia  Caprarola 
Bonzi Perfetta  Borromeo  Castel  Gandolfo 
Both  Pomarancio  Brancallero  Castel San Pietro 
Brandi Porpora  Campello  Catania 
Bril Poussin  Capocaccia  Cesena 
Brueghel G.  Preti  Cardelli  Fano 
Camassei M.  Preti  Cerasi  Fara 
Caravaggio Reni  Chigi  Foligno 
Caroselli G.  Romanelli  Colonna  Frascati 
Carracci U.  Romanelli  Correggio  Lanuvio 
Cerquozzi  Rondoni  Corsini  San Quirico d'Orcia 
Cerrini Rosa  de  Rossi  Spoleto 
Chiari Sacchi  Farnese  Tivoli 
Ciampelli Salini  Filomarino   
Cigoli Saraceni  Fugotto  MEDIUM: 
Codazzi Sassoferrato  Giustiniani  Arezzo 
Courtois G.  Stanchi  Gonzaga  Ferrara 
Cozza N.  Stanchi  Guicciardini Florence 
Cresti Stella  Mattei  Mantua 
Cortona Stom  Mazarin  Messina 
V. de Boulogne  Swanevelt  Medici  Milan 
Domenichino Tanari  Nolfi  Naples 
Dughet Tassi  Orsini  Palermo 
Elsheimer Tempesta  Pamphilj  Perugia 
Ferri Tomasini  Peretti  Montalto  Pistoia 
F. Napoletano  Trevisani  Pointel  Siena 
Galli Turchi  Riviera  Venice 
Gaulli Vajani  Roscioli   
A. Gentileschi  F. Vanni  Rospigliosi  EXPORTS: 
G. Gimignani  R. Vanni  Ruffo  Antwerp 
L. Gimignani  Viola  Sacchetti  Austria 
Gramatica Vouet  Santacroce  Dalmazia 
Grimaldi   Santori  London 
Honthorst   Savoia  Madrid 
Jannetti   Sfondrato  Paris 
Laer   Spada  Rouen 
Lanfranco   Valguarnera  Switzerland 
Leoni   Vatican   
Lorrain      
Manfredi      
Manfredi      
Maratti      
Maratti & Onofri       
Mattia      
Mei       
Miel       
 Table A2: Log Price determination, within genres, patrons and artists
within genres within patrons within artist
no patron, no artist no genre, no artist no genre, no patron
(1) (2) (3)
Size 0.039*** 0.055*** 0.055***
(4.615) (5.934) (5.256)
Size^2 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
(-3.630) (-4.318) (-4.253)
# commissions -0.026*** -0.156*** 0.001
(-3.019) (-8.214) (0.0756)
Copy -0.797*** -0.533* 0.204
(-2.869) (-1.889) (0.793)
Not on canvas -0.309** -0.269** -0.189
(-2.046) (-2.031) (-1.130)
Fresco -0.087 -0.481** -0.245
(-0.534) (-2.163) (-1.244)
Private chapel 1.697*** 0.806*** 1.553***
(9.429) (3.101) (7.937)
Church and other rel  0.851*** 0.940*** 1.098***
(6.688) (5.003) (7.771)
Private palace 0.429*** 0.352* 0.348***
(2.992) (1.859) (2.712)
Private collection (omitted)
Minor destinations -0.432*** -0.176 -0.196
(-2.920) (-0.698) (-1.199)
Medium destinations 0.445*** 0.284 0.342***
(3.998) (1.285) (3.046)
Exports 0.868*** 0.425 0.605***
(5.158) (1.377) (2.608)
Rome (omitted)




Constant 1.270*** 2.667*** 0.039
(6.621) (9.268) (0.276)
Observations 732 801 801
R-squared 0.648 0.703 0.760
Robust t-statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1